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Joint group membership is of major importance for cooperation in humans, and close ties or familiarity
with a partner are also thought to promote cooperation in other animals. Here, we present the opposite
pattern: female cleaner ﬁsh, Labroides dimidiatus, behave more cooperatively (by feeding more against
their preference) when paired with an unfamiliar male rather than with their social partner. We propose
that cooperation based on asymmetric punishment causes this reversed pattern. Males are larger than and
dominant to female partners and are more aggressive to unfamiliar than to familiar female partners. In
response, females behave more cooperatively with unfamiliar male partners. Our data suggest that in
asymmetric interactions, weaker players might behave more cooperatively with out-group members
than with in-group members to avoid harsher punishment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The prediction that players will cooperate more with fam-
iliar partners than with strangers has been supported in
several empirical studies, both in humans and non-
human species. For example, people are more likely to
cooperate and more readily forgive defections when inter-
acting with friends rather than strangers [1–4]. Similarly,
close ties or familiarity with a partner are also thought to
promotecooperationin otheranimals [5–7].Forexample,
among non-human primates, the mutual exchange of ser-
vices and resources is often more common among closely
bonded individuals than among more distantly connected
individuals [5,8], while data from a laboratory study of
zebra ﬁnches (Taeniopygia guttata) showed that individuals
behaved more cooperatively with a familiar social partner
than with an unknown partner [7].
Familiarity with a partner may increase cooperation if
it is used as a proxy to judge the probability of future
interactions and the associated likelihood of reaping a
return on cooperative investments. Individuals with joint
territorial boundaries, overlapping home ranges, or that
belong to the same group will interact again in the
future with a higher probability than individuals without
stable territories or home ranges, or that meet during
migration or belong to different groups. In the face of
variation in the probability of re-encountering an inter-
action partner, individuals are expected to adapt their
behaviour to the probability of future interactions
(‘shadow of the future’; [9,10]). This is because coopera-
tive interactions often involve investments, or behaviours
that reduce the current payoff of the actor while increas-
ing the payoff of a recipient [11,12]. The actor’s initial
investment may often be repaid by a reciprocal return
investment from the recipient (or a bystander) [13,14]
or, alternatively, because the actor’s initial investment
enables the recipient (or a bystander) to perform a self-
serving response that beneﬁts the actor as a by-product
[15,16]. Return beneﬁts are more likely to arise where
actor and recipient expect to interact again in the future
[13]. Therefore, familiarity with a partner is expected to
promote cooperation because players may have an
increased expectation that they will meet familiar partners
again and therefore play as if in a repeated, rather than
one-shot, game [1,17].
Partner familiarity might also support cooperation if
familiar partners are more likely to have interdependent
ﬁtness [18], as may be the case with breeding partners
or members of cooperative social groups, for example.
Where ﬁtness interests coincide in this way, individuals
might behave more cooperatively with familiar partners
because harming the partner to some extent also harms
oneself. For example, in the aforementioned study using
zebra ﬁnches, we note that though Prisoner’s Dilemma
payoffs were used (where defection yields higher immedi-
ate payoffs than cooperating, regardless of the partner’s
behaviour), social zebra ﬁnch pairs may have interdepen-
dent ﬁtness [12]. This is because males and females often
work together during a breeding season to raise young
[19]. As singleton parents are highly unsuccessful
(S. Grifﬁth, unpublished data), cheating the partner
may cause negative feedback to oneself [12]. If that is
the case, then the payoffs in that laboratory experiment
would approximate those of a Prisoner’s Dilemma only
with an unfamiliar partner. With a familiar partner, the
payoffs would approximate those of the Prisoner’s Delight
game [20], where each player does best to cooperate,
regardless of the partner’s behaviour [18].
In the current study, we tested experimentally whether
familiarity with a partner affected cooperation among
mixed-sex pairs of bluestreak cleaner wrasse (Labroides
dimidiatus). Cleaners sometimes work in mixed-sex pairs * Author for correspondence (n.raihani@ucl.ac.uk).
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service to reef ﬁsh clients by removing skin ectoparasites,
they prefer to feed on client mucus. This preference results
in a conﬂict of interest between cleaners and clients [22],
and also between cleaners during joint client inspections
[21,23]. Feeding on preferred mucus often leads to the ter-
mination of an interaction [24]. Therefore, as feeding
against preference prolongs the interaction and hence the
partner’s access to the client, the extent to which cleaners
feed against their preference is a measure of cooperative
behaviour towards the co-inspecting partner [23]. In
contrast, feeding on preferred food constitutes cheating
the partner as it stops the latter’s access to the client.
Cooperation within mixed-sex pairs of cleaner ﬁsh is
based on asymmetric punishment [23,25] rather than
positive reciprocity or other mechanisms (see [26]).
Punishment occurs when a cheated individual pays a
short-term cost to inﬂict harm on the cheating partner.
Despite the initial cost, punishers may nevertheless
beneﬁt from their actions if the partner behaves more
cooperatively in subsequent interactions [27,28]. Male
cleaner ﬁsh are larger than and dominant to their
female partners, and previous work using model Plexiglas
‘clients’ has shown that males aggressively punish females
if females cheat during joint inspections [21,23,25].
Females provide a better service quality in response to
male punishment, by feeding more against their prefer-
ence [23,25]. This yields beneﬁts to males because they
can interact with joint clients for longer and thereby
increase their food intake [23]. This feature of cooperative
interactions among mixed-sex pairs of cleaner ﬁsh meant
we could investigate how partner familiarity affected
cooperation in a system where cooperation is based on
asymmetric punishment, rather than positive reciprocity.
We consider two alternative hypotheses. Since punish-
ment is an investment, individuals might be more likely to
punish familiar partners if they expect to interact with
these individuals more often in the future. Thus, in
response to cheating, male cleaner ﬁsh might be more
likely to punish familiar females. This would be particu-
larly likely if the punishment yields long-term improved
cooperative behaviour in the partner. Alternatively, if
familiar partners have interdependent ﬁtness then punish-
ment might more often be inﬂicted on unfamiliar partners
than on familiar individuals. This is because punishing an
interdependent partner may to some extent also reduce
the punisher’s ﬁtness. If established male–female cleaner
ﬁsh pairs have interdependent ﬁtness then it is possible
that males will punish unfamiliar females more for cheat-
ing, especially if the beneﬁts of punishment are accrued
with short delay.
2. METHODS
Data were collected at Lizard Island Research Station,
Australia (14_40S, 145_28E) in 2010 and 2011. Each year,
12 established pairs of cleaner ﬁsh were caught with a barrier
net and housed in pairs in aquaria (45   30   25 cm) for two
to four weeks before experiments began. All cleaners were
provided with a polyvinylchloride shelter tube (1   10 cm).
Fish were trained to feed off Plexiglas plates (15   10 cm),
which presented cleaners with the same foraging rules that
they face when interacting with real clients. These Plexiglas
‘clients’ contained items of mashed prawn, or ﬁsh ﬂakes
mixed with prawn (hereafter ‘ﬂake’), placed on them.
Cleaners preferred prawn to ﬂake but were trained that
eating prawn led to plate removal. Thus, as with real clients,
cleaner ﬁsh had to feed against their preference to continue
interactions with model Plexiglas clients. All ﬁsh ate ﬂake
items before eating prawn items prior to commencing exper-
iments (see [21] for more details and a schematic of the
Plexiglas plate).
Twenty-four female cleaner ﬁsh were sequentially paired
with (i) their familiar male partner and (ii) an unfamiliar male
partner (treatment order was counterbalanced). Unfamiliar
males were size-matched to the female’s familiar male partner
because previous work on this system has shown that males
are more aggressive to similar-sized females [25]. This is
because the bluestreak cleaner wrasse is a protogynous her-
maphrodite, where female sex change appears to be prevented
by the presence of a larger and more aggressive male [29].
Females that approach or exceed the current male in size may
change sex, thereby becoming a reproductive competitor
rather than remaining as a breeding partner. Male cleaners
used in this study were on average 8.2+0.1 cm (total length,
mean+se),whilefemaleswere7.0+0.1 cm.Themeandiffer-
ence in size (size asymmetry) between familiar male–female
partners was 1.1+0.1 cm and the mean difference in size
between familiar and unfamiliar male partners was 0.02+
0.1 cm. Data from one unfamiliar pair were not used in the
analysis since the female was quite close in size to the new
male partner (asymmetry ¼ 0.5 cm) and immediately became
dominant to the unfamiliar male. Thus, analyses are based on
data from 45 pairs (24 familiar pairs and 23 unfamiliar pairs).
(a) 2010 data collection
In 2010, each pair was observed for a total of 48 trials. There
were two experimental treatments: (i) familiar partners
(24 trials per couple) and (ii) unfamiliar partners (24 trials
per couple). Experiments took place over four days, with
12 trials and a single treatment per couple per day. A trial
consisted of a single plate presentation to a cleaner ﬁsh
couple. Trials were separated by an interval of at least
30 min (maximum 60 min) to prevent satiation.
(b) 2011 data collection
In 2011, we recorded foraging decisions of male and female
cleaner ﬁsh with unfamiliar and familiar partners as we did
in 2010, and also introduced a ‘separation’ treatment to
assess the causal effect of male punishment on female foraging
behaviour. In the separation treatment, males were prevented
from punishing female partners by way of a temporary trans-
parent partition. In the separation treatment, both ﬁsh could
see one another and both still foraged on the same plate (as
in [20]). In 2011, there were four experimental conditions:
(i) familiar partners, together (16 trials per couple);
(ii) familiar partners, separated (16 trials per couple);
(iii) unfamiliar partners, together (16 trials per couple); and
(iv) unfamiliar partners, separated (16 trials per couple).
Experiments were conducted over eight days, with eight trials
and a single treatment per couple per day. In 2011, each trial
consisted of two plate presentations, which were separated by
a 1 min interval. This design allowed us to investigate the
short-term effects of male punishment on female foraging
behaviour (as in [23]). As in 2010, trials were separated
by a minimum interval of 30 min (maximum 60 min) to
prevent satiation.
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17.00 h. Fish were not fed between trials, although in 2011,
all ﬁsh were fed at the end of each experimental day. Since
some data suggest that cleaners may behave more coopera-
tively (feed more against preference) when satiated
(R. Bshary & A. Pinto, unpublished data), we expected that
thisadditionalfeedingmightmeanthatcleanerswouldbegen-
erally more cooperative in 2011 than in 2010. As such, we
controlled for year in our statistical models, where appropri-
ate. Treatment order was counterbalanced. In each
presentation, a model Plexiglas client was made available to
both members of the cleaner ﬁsh pair so that both individuals
could begin foraging simultaneously. The model client was
removed by the experimenter immediately after one cleaner
ate a prawn item, signifying the end of the presentation.
In each presentation, we recorded the number of ﬂake items
eaten by males and females, respectively, and the identity of
the ﬁsh that ate the prawn item. In the 60 s following plate
removal, we recorded the number of times the male chased
the female as a measure of male aggression. This value was
divided by the number of trials to obtain an aggression rate
for each couple. Male aggression was not recorded during
the separation treatment because males could not chase
females.
(i) What factors affected female foraging behaviour?
First, we asked whether familiarity with the male partner
affected female foraging behaviour (model 1). For each
female, we calculated the ratio of ﬂake items eaten per
prawn item by summing the total number of ﬂake items
she ate and dividing by the total number of prawn items
she ate over all presentations. This value was log-transformed
and set as the response term in a linear mixed model (LMM)
with normal error structure. Partner familiarity (familiar/
unfamiliar), size asymmetry (cm), year (2010/2011) and
treatment (separate/together) were included as potential
explanatory terms. Model 1 was based on 70 data points
from a total of 23 females (11 from 2010 and 12 from 2011).
Using a subset of the data (data collected in 2011), we then
askedwhether theintensityofmaleaggressionfollowingfemale
cheating(prawneating)intheﬁrstpresentationaffectedfemale
foraging behaviour inthe secondpresentation(model 2). Since
presentations one and two were separated by a 1 min interval,
this model allowed us to assess the immediate effects of male
aggression on female behaviour. Using instances where the
femaleatetheprawnintheﬁrstpresentation(n ¼ 269instances
from12females), wecreateda binary responsetermwhere1 ¼
female ate prawn again in the second presentation and 0 ¼
female did not eat prawn in the second presentation. This
binary response term was set as the response term in a general-
ized LMM with binomial error structure. Male aggression
following the ﬁrst presentation, the size asymmetry between
the pair and partner familiarity (familiar/unfamiliar) were
included as explanatory terms.
Finally, we asked whether anyeffects of male aggression on
female cheating persisted for more than 30 min by asking
whether females were less likely to cheat in trial n þ 1 follow-
ing severe male aggression in trial n (model 3). Since trials
were separated by a minimum of 30 min and a maximum of
60 min, this model allowed us to assess whether there were
any longer-term effects of male aggression on female foraging
behaviour. As in model 2, we used instances where females
cheated in trial n but we had a larger sample size since data
from both 2010 and 2011 could be used. Data from 2011
wererestricted to trialswherefemales cheatedin the ﬁrstpres-
entation of trial n. Based on 509 cheating events (23 females),
we created a binary response term where 1 ¼ female cheated
again in trial n þ 1 and 0 ¼ female did not cheat again in
trial n þ 1. This binary response term was set as the response
term in a generalized LMM with binomial error structure.
Male aggression, the size asymmetry between the pair and
partner familiarity (familiar/unfamiliar) and year (2010/
2011) were included as explanatory terms. In models 1–3,
male and female identities were included as random terms
to control for the effects of repeated measures on the distri-
bution of the data.
(ii) What factors affected male punishment of cheating females?
Weaskedwhether maleaggressionwasassociatedwithpartner
familiarity (model 4). Male aggression (chases per second)
was log-transformed and set as the response term in an
LMM with normal error structure. Partner familiarity
(familiar/unfamiliar), year (2010/2011) and size asymmetry
were included as explanatory terms, and male and female
identities were included as random terms. Model analysis
was based on 46 data points from 23 females (11 from 2010
and 12 from 2011). The sample size for this model is smaller
than the sample size for model 1 because data from the
separation treatment were not included.
(iii) What factors affected male foraging behaviour?
We then investigated how familiarity with the female partner
affected male foraging behaviour (model 5). The ratio of
ﬂake to prawn items eaten by males was calculated in the
same way as for females (total number of ﬂake items eaten/
total number of prawn items eaten). This value was log-
transformed and set as the response term in an LMM with
normal error structure. We included partner familiarity
(familiar/unfamiliar), size asymmetry and year (2010/2011)
as ﬁxed terms. Male and female identities were included as
random terms in the model to control for the effects of
repeated measures on the distribution of the data. Data
from one male were also excluded from the ﬁnal model,
since it ate an extremely high ratio of ﬂake to prawn items
(ﬂake to prawn ratio 49 compared with a mean of 4.2+
0.4), which signiﬁcantly affected the ﬁt of the model to the
data and resulted in a violation of the assumption of normally
distributed residuals. The model analysis was, therefore,
based on 45 data points from 26 males.
Summarized details of all models are presented in table 1.
Data were analysed with R v. 2.8.1 (www.r-project.org). Tests
were two-tailed and data were checked and transformed where
necessary to ensure they satisﬁed the assumptions of statistical
tests. Models were run by initially including all terms in a ‘full’
model and then sequentially dropping explanatory terms,
retaining only those whose removal resulted in a signiﬁcant
loss of predictive power. The signiﬁcance of dropped terms
was obtained by adding them to the resultant ‘minimal’
model. All two-way interactions were checked but only
presented where p , 0.05.
3. RESULTS
(i) What factors affected female foraging behaviour?
Femalesateahigherratioofﬂaketoprawnitemswhenpaired
with an unfamiliar male partner (model 1: x
2 ¼ 5.2, p ¼
0.02; ﬁgures 1 and 2) and ate a lower ratio of ﬂake to
prawn items when male punishment was prevented (model
Familiarity reduces cooperation N. J. Raihani et al. 2481
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2 ¼ 4.1, p ¼ 0.04; ﬁgure 3). The signiﬁcant negative
effect of size asymmetry on the ratio of ﬂake to prawn items
eaten by females (model 1: x
2 ¼ 5.4, p ¼ 0.02, ﬁgure 2)
was controlled for in the above results. We also found that
f e m a l e sw e r eg e n e r a l l ym o r ec o o p e r a t i v e( a t em o r ea g a i n s t
their preference) in the second year of this study (model 1:
x
2 ¼ 4.2, p ¼ 0.04; ﬁgure 1). The tendency for females that
cheated in the ﬁrst presentation to cheat again in the
second presentation was negativelyassociated with the inten-
sity of male punishment (model 2: x
2 ¼ 3.92, p ¼ 0.048).
There were no signiﬁcant effects of size asymmetry (model
2: x
2 ¼ 0.57, p ¼ 0.45) or partner familiarity (model 2:
x
2 ¼ 0.06, p ¼ 0.80) on female propensity to cheat again.
There were no signiﬁcant lasting effects of male aggression
on female propensity to cheat again in the next trial (model
3: x
2 ¼ 0.40, p ¼ 0.53), although females were generally
more likely to cheat again in the ﬁrst year of this study than
in the second year (model 3: x
2 ¼ 6.72, p ¼ 0.01).
(ii) What factors affected male aggression against
female partners?
Females received more aggression from unfamiliar males
than from familiar male partners (model 4: x
2 ¼ 9.32,
p ¼ 0.002; ﬁgure 4), after controlling for the negative
effect of size asymmetry on male aggression (model 4:
x
2 ¼ 7.08, p ¼ 0.008, ﬁgure 4). There was no signiﬁcant
effect of year during which data were collected on male
aggression (model 4: x
2 ¼ 2.76, p ¼ 1.0).
(iii) What factors affected male foraging behaviour?
Unlike females, familiarity with a partner did not seem to
affect male foraging decisions. The ratio of ﬂake to prawn
items eaten by males was not signiﬁcantly affected by
partner familiarity (model 5: x
2 ¼ 0.11, p ¼ 0.74),
by the size asymmetry within the pair (model 5: x
2 ¼
1.34, p ¼ 0.25), or by the year during which the data
were collected (model 5: x
2 ¼ 3.46, p ¼ 0.062).
4. DISCUSSION
During joint inspections with model clients, female clea-
ner ﬁsh cooperated more (by feeding more against their
preference) with unfamiliar than with familiar male part-
ners. Female cooperative behaviour can be explained
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Figure 1. Ratio of ﬂake to prawn items (+s.e.) eaten by
female cleaner ﬁsh when paired with a familiar and unfamiliar
male partner, according to the year when the data were col-
lected. Mean values were generated from raw data and so do
notcontrolforother termsinthemodel.Shadedbars,familiar
partners; open bars, unfamiliar partners.
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species. Males were more aggressive to unfamiliar female
partners and female propensity to cheat again decreased
with increasing severity of male punishment. Further-
more, females behaved less cooperatively (with both
familiar and unfamiliar males) when male aggression
was prevented. Asymmetric punishment may also explain
why male behaviour was unaffected by the familiarity of
the female partner. Female cleaner ﬁsh are subordinate
to males and do not punish male partners for cheating
[23]. Since punishment appears to be a key mechanism
that causes cleaner ﬁsh to behave more cooperatively
[23,25,30], male foraging behaviour may be unaffected
by partner familiarity per se.
The fact that males were more aggressive to unfamiliar
females than familiar females may initially seem coun-
terintuitive. Punishment is an investment, the beneﬁts
of which can be gained through future interactions with
the punished individual [27,28,31]. Since familiar
partners may be more likely to interact in the future than
unfamiliar partners, we could predict that individuals
would be more likely to punish familiar partners. Instead,
we found the opposite pattern. This pattern may arise
because, in this system, the beneﬁts to males of punishing
females (in terms of increased female cooperative behav-
iour) arise immediately. Interactions with clients are
extremely frequent (approx. 2300 interactions per day,
[32]), meaning that males may beneﬁt from increased
female cooperative behaviour very soon after inﬂicting
the punishment. Moreover, the effects of punishment are
short-lived: we found no signiﬁcant effect of male punish-
ment intensity on female propensity to cheat again
30–60 min after the punishment. Thus, in this system,
males may gain no additional beneﬁt, in terms of increased
probability of future interactions, from punishing familiar
rather than unfamiliar females.
Instead, interdependencies in ﬁtness could mean that
males experiencelower netbeneﬁtswhentheypunish fam-
iliar females, thus explaining why males were more
aggressive to unfamiliar females in this study. We suggest
that the costs to male cleaner ﬁsh of female cheating
might vary according to whether the female is a social
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Figure 2. Ratio of ﬂake to prawn items eaten by female with (a) familiar male partners and (b) unfamiliar male partners accord-
ing to size asymmetry (centimetres) within the pair. The thick black lines were generated from predictions based on the
minimal model. The grey shaded area represents the standard error associated with the ﬁxed effect (partner familiarity).
Dashed lines are the standard error associated with the predictions for the random terms in the model. Points were generated
from raw data.
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Figure 3. Ratio of ﬂake to prawn items eaten (+s.e.) by
female cleaner ﬁsh when male punishment was allowed and
when it was prevented. Means were generated from raw data.
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costs when familiar, rather than unfamiliar, female part-
ners cheat if the extra energy gained by cheating females
translates into the production of extra eggs. If cheating by
familiar females is less costly to their male partners, selec-
tion may favour decreased investment in punishment.
Similarinterdependenciesinﬁtnesshavealsobeeninvoked
to explain the patterns of cooperation observed in captive
zebra ﬁnches [7,12]. Variation in the costs experienced
by males when females cheat might also explain why
male punishment of cheating females varied with the size
asymmetry within the pair. In this species, larger females
pose a reproductive threat to males since they may be
more likely to change sex [29]. Accordingly, here and pre-
viously [25], we have shown that males are more likely to
punish relatively large females that cheat, while remaining
more tolerant of cheating by smaller females. In this study,
we found that relatively small females were also less coop-
erative—this may be a direct consequence of the fact that
small females that cheated tended to receive less severe
aggression from males.
An alternative (and non exclusive) explanation for the
observed pattern of increased male aggression towards
unfamiliar female partners is that males use aggression to
establish dominance over unfamiliar females. As such,
males may initially be very aggressive towards unfamiliar
females and this might precipitate increased cooperative
behaviour from female cleaners. If this were the case
then we would expect male aggression in response to
female cheating to diminish over time, though we did not
collect data for long enough to test this idea.
In general, we predict that in interactions where players
do not have interdependent ﬁtness, individuals will be
more likely to invest either to beneﬁt or to harm partners
when partners are familiar. This is because, all else being
equal, familiar partners may be more likely to interact
frequently and so individuals stand a greater chance of
reaping a return on their initial investment. This predic-
tion holds even in cases where the beneﬁts of
investment arise through the self-serving behaviour of
the partner (pseudo-reciprocity) rather than through
costly return investments (reciprocity). This is because
individuals might be most likely to reap the beneﬁts
associated with investing in helping or harming a partner
if they expect to meet the partner again in the future or
when association with the partner allows them to beneﬁt
from the partner’s self-serving behaviour. Conversely, the
predictions differ in interactions where players’ ﬁtness
interests coincide to some extent. Here, individuals might
be more likely to invest in familiar partners when the
investment beneﬁts the partner. However, where the
investment harms the partner (as is the case with punish-
ment) then individuals might instead invest more in
punishing unfamiliar partners.
In humans, so-called parochialism refers to the ten-
dency for people to punish out-group members more
severely than in-group members for cheating [33–36].
Hostility towards out-group members is expected to go
hand in hand with increased cooperative behaviour
towards in-group individuals and may have been selec-
tively advantageous in inter-group conﬂicts [33,35,37],
but see [38]. The data we present here in cleaner ﬁsh
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Figure 4. Male aggression (chases per second) against (a) familiar female partners and (b) unfamiliar female partners according
to the size asymmetry (centimetres) within the pair. The thick black lines were generated from predictions based on the mini-
mal model. The grey shaded areas represent the standard error associated with the ﬁxed effect (partner familiarity). Dashed
lines are the standard error associated with the predictions for the random terms in the model. Points were generated from
raw data.
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ever, in our experiment, male cleaner ﬁsh were more
hostile towards unfamiliar females without being more
cooperative towards familiar female partners. Moreover,
as a consequence of more severe aggression, females
were more cooperative with unfamiliar males than with
their established male partner. Our results are not directly
comparable to the human studies because the latter are
typically designed in such a way that punishment can be
administered only by bystanders and games usually con-
sist of only one round [33]. It would be interesting to
test how humans and other species behave in a game
that ﬁts our experiment. We suggest that in asymmetric
repeated interactions where cooperation is based on
self-serving punishment, weaker players might behave
more cooperatively with outsiders than with in-group
members to avoid harsher punishment.
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